In March 1999, European Agriculture Ministers reformed the CAP. Two weeks later, the European Council amended this reform in order to contain budget costs. Under French pressure, this was achieved by partially reversing the first reform. This paper examines the pressures shaping the 1999 reforms. The second agreement has failed to prepare the CAP for EU enlargement, WTO negotiations and the containment of budget costs. In the light of this, future reform options are considered. It is argued that prices must be cut further, whilst the phased reduction of direct payments will contain budget costs effectively. 1 The author is indebted to the editor and anonymous referees for comments that proved tremendously useful in helping to improve the paper. All remaining shortcomings remain his fault alone.
I. Introduction
In March 1999 the European Council, meeting in Berlin, agreed a reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which superseded a deal the Ministers of Agriculture agreed -or thought they had agreed -two weeks earlier. This paper seeks an explanation of the nature of the second reform, before indicating briefly why further reform will be needed. In suggesting possible directions for reform, three options discussed but not agreed upon during negotiations are examined: degressivity (the reduction over time of direct payments), co-financing (sharing CAP budget costs between EU and national budgets) and modulation (targeting support towards smaller farms). Degressivity offers the best way of containing budget costs. Accompanied by the elimination of price support, this will facilitate agreement in international trade talks and accommodate enlargement.
II. The Background to the 1999 Reform
In 1992 a CAP reform was agreed that reduced support prices and export subsidies and introduced or extended direct payments to farmers, driven by the need to cut trade-distorting agricultural policies in the GATT Uruguay Round. As a result, arable sector spending rose from 10.4 billion ECU in 1992 to 17.5 billion ECU in 1997, pushing total CAP guarantee spending from 31.4 billion ECU in 1992 to 40.7 billion ECU in 1997. This rise is an inevitable consequence of replacing support based on high (consumer) prices with direct (taxpayer) payments from the EU budget. 1993 , Ingersent et al 1998 , Kay 1998 , Meunier 1998 , Coleman and Tangermann 1999 and Daugbjerg 1999 . 2 P o s t -P r i n t resolutely opposing price cuts, only agreeing to the 1992 reform when it became clear a continued 'stabilizer' policy would generate large uncompensated price cuts (Kay, 1998, page 124) . France was the least reform minded country and, having agreed to the 1992 reform, ensured the GATT agreement left the new CAP unchanged (Meunier, 1998) . Third, in seeking compromise to broker agreement, the chair (Portugal) removed elements of the proposal that would have been to its benefit. Aspects of all these features entered the 1999 reform process. Including the 10 applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the figures are nearly 49 million tonnes and 65 million tonnes respectively. The EU is, therefore, likely to reach the limit on subsidised export volumes, especially if the OECD forecast of weak world markets over the next two years proves correct.
Moreover, the Millennium Round of World Trade Organisation (WTO) talks will examine the continued use of export subsidies and other countries are expected to demand the EU eliminate the remaining links between support payments and production. Ultimately, the Agenda 2000 reforms were motivated by EU enlargement.
There is concern that extending an unreformed CAP to several new member states with large agricultural sectors will prove prohibitively expensive for the EU budget.
III. CAP Reform 1999
The reforms of March 1999 followed those of 1992 by continuing to replace high prices with direct payments. Initially, the Ministers of Agriculture cut cereals intervention prices by 20%, with direct payments increased to offset half of this.
Payments for oilseeds and linseed were cut to fall in line with cereals payments and for protein crops, payments were cut but a small premium retained over other crops.
Set-aside was retained in principle, but the rate normally set at zero. These changes would be phased in -over two years for the cereals price and set aside changes, three for the oilseeds changes. In the beef sector, prices were cut by 20%, with direct payments increased for bulls (by 55%), steers and suckler cows (both 38%). In the dairy sector, a 15% cut in the intervention price, a direct payment per tonne (of quota) and an increase in quota were agreed. Most countries will get 1.5% more quota, but Commission felt further changes were 'unlikely' as the limit was exceeded by just 2%, but EU foreign ministers indicated they would need to 'fine-tune' the deal. This came two weeks later, when the European Council reached a second agreement. The only significant change for dairy was to delay the introduction of the reforms to 2005/06. For beef, changes were made to intervention arrangements. The 4 P o s t -P r i n t main changes were made to the arable sector reform. First, the cereals intervention price cut was reduced to 15%, meaning smaller increases in cereals direct payments and larger cuts in the payments for other arable crops (except protein crops, increasing the premium). Also, the 'normal' set aside rate was raised to 10%. German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder felt the second agreement would still breach the spending limit, however, and Günther Verheugen, then German deputy foreign minister, conceded further reform would be needed before 2006, especially given the smaller price cut.
During negotiations, cost cutting alternatives had been discussed but not agreed upon. The need for further reform, elaborated on below, indicates inappropriate policy choices were made. The remaining sections explore the debate leading to the final agreement and how the reform options not adopted could help prepare the CAP for the pressures that lie ahead.
IV. From Agenda 2000 to the Second Agreement
The 1997 Prior to the first agreement the Commission, in seeking compromise, suggested changes to the allocation of dairy quota and phasing in the arable reforms, which were accepted. Germany proposed reducing the depth of price cuts, to 10% for cereals and 20% for beef, but the Commission felt this was 'totally unacceptable'.
Although this was expected to save about euro 16.6 billion over the period to 2006, it would reduce the effectiveness of the reform too much. These negotiations thus confirm the idea that the speed of CAP reform is determined by the least reform-minded member state. Meunier (1998) 
V. Possible Directions for Further Reform of the CAP
Given the pressures on the CAP from further rises in budget costs, enlargement and international commitments, further CAP reform will be needed. Various reform options will be examined briefly to consider their relative merits in allowing the CAP to accommodate enlargement and likely WTO demands.
The Elimination of Price Support
The European Council reached an agreement retaining price support, with set aside set at 10%. Initially, however, the Ministers of Agriculture cut cereals prices by 20%.
This was expected to eliminate price support and the need for set aside and export subsidies under normal market conditions. Further cuts in prices down to the level agreed by the Ministers of Agriculture would provide the CAP with several benefits.
There would be a budget saving from the elimination of export subsidies and, in addition, the EU would no longer be bound by GATT/WTO limits on subsidised exports. With this limit removed, intervention could become an outlet of last resort.
Given the limit on subsidy expenditures, the elimination of price support would not generate large savings on such spending. EU forecasts for intervention stocks noted earlier, however, suggest that large savings are possible if the EU does not have to resort to intervention in order to respect export subsidy limits. of certain farmers receiving extremely large support payments, the overall effect on the budget costs will be limited by the relatively small number of large farms in existing and new member states, unless a severe limit is placed on payments for large farms. Modulation has consistently been opposed by countries such as the UK, France and Denmark and they are likely to be joined by those new member states with larger average farm sizes.
Co-Financing
Co-financing contains the cost of the CAP to the EU budget by transferring some spending to national budgets. It does not, therefore, reduce the total cost of the policy.
Moreover, it could increase policing costs, with national payments monitored to 10 P o s t -P r i n t ensure they did not distort trade and competition. Co-financing was favoured by
Germany as a means of reducing its EU budget contribution but was, unsurprisingly, opposed by countries such as France, Ireland and Spain who are major net recipients of CAP transfers. Given the cost of economic transition, the transfer of some CAP funding to national exchequers could place an excessively large burden on new member states, who may also therefore question co-financing as a suitable direction for CAP reform.
Degressivity
As a reform option, the UK proposed degressivity prior to the May 1992 CAP reform (Kay, 1998, p. 125) . Prior to the 1999 agreement, France proposed cutting payments by 1-3% per year with exemptions for small farmers, whilst the UK suggested cutting all direct payments by 4%. Estimates indicated cuts of 3% per year for all payments could save euro 4.6 billion over seven years, whereas annual cuts of 3% to arable payments and 1% in other sectors would save about euro 3.1 billion. In its most extreme form, degressivity could eliminate direct payments over a fixed time period.
Degressivity would mean that whilst the cost of enlargement would initially be high, over time the costs would be reduced. Moreover, extending direct payments to new member states could create tensions between those receiving the payments and neighbours who were not. Degressivity would help to limit these potential problems.
Other Concerns over Direct Payments
With enlargement, of great concern is the budgetary implication of extending the CAP to new member states. The main budget costs of the CAP are the direct payments,
given the direction of both the 1992 and 1999 reforms. One way of limiting the cost 11 P o s t -P r i n t of enlargement is simply not to extend these payments to new member states: "When it comes to enlargement, no major price cuts are expected to take place in the CEC's.
On the contrary, for some products accession could well lead to moderate price increases. If this is the case, there will be no economic reason for compensation, at least in the logic of the 1992 reforms" (European Commission 1999, p. 27). Not extending direct payments would also avoid creating tensions in the new member states between those receiving payments and those not, but not extending them would raise other issues.
It would bring the principle of the acquis into question, as well as undermine the 'common' nature of the CAP, something that existing member states have sought to preserve. Moreover, the payments were extended in full to Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, even though the level was determined not by the price changes they experienced, but by the price cuts agreed in 1992 by the EC12. Moreover, as world prices rose in the mid 1990s, the level of payment did not change. The "logic of the 1992 reforms" is, therefore, unclear. Is it a specific level of payment to offset specific price cuts, or a general switch in the basis of policy? There is, therefore, a political decision yet to be made. Large budget savings can be realised by not extending the payments to new member states, but the issues this raises may necessitate the full extension of the CAP to all new member states, with other reforms needed to contain the large rise in budget costs.
The WTO negotiations will also challenge the direct payments. Although the payments introduced in 1992 do not break fully the link between support and production (that is, are not fully de-coupled), they go some way to achieving this. For this, they were exempt from the 20% cut imposed under the Uruguay Round Pressure for further reform comes from several directions. Eliminating price support would remove GATT/WTO constraints on subsidised exports, but would not break the link between support and production existing in the current payments.
Enlargement will raise the budget cost of the CAP without further reform. Eliminating price support will remove subsidy costs and reduce storage costs, but would result in higher direct payments unless either the price cuts were uncompensated or they were accompanied by other reforms. Of modulation, co-financing and degressivity, it is argued that degressivity is the best accompaniment.
The EU has already indicated an approximate timescale for a 'review' of the CAP agreement. Fischler (1999a, p. 3) 
